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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court had original appellate jurisdiction of this appeal under 
Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(j). Pursuant to its authority under Utah Code section 
78A-3-102(4), the Utah Supreme Court transferred the case to this Court effective on 
September 20, 2009. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78A-4-
103(2)0). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
This appeal presents the following two issues on appeal along with a request for 
attorneys fees on appeal: 
1. Appellants believe the trial court did err when applying the flexible and 
reasoned approach in determining the prevailing party in this case when it failed to "look 
at the amounts actually sought," including Defendants' Rule 68 offer of judgment, and 
"then balance them proportionally with what was received" as required by Utah law; or 
the Court went beyond the limited discretion granted the trial court in its analysis and 
weighing process, failing to find that the Lunds were the prevailing party. 
Standard of review: The trial courts' extensive trial related findings of fact and 
conclusions of law as embodied in the Court's Ruling and Oder are not in dispute in this 
appeal. The trial court's ruling on its prevailing party decision in the "Memorandum 
Decision" largely involved the application of "flexible and reasoned approach," as 
articulated by the Utah appellate Courts, to the findings of fact made in the earlier Ruling 
and Order. The question on appeal then is a question of law or mixed question of law and 
1 
fact. The Supreme Court in Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890 (Utah 1996) has 
changed its position on the standard of review for a determination of a question of 
reasonableness of attorney fees from an abuse of discretion standard to one of a mixed 
question of fact and law: 
Historically, this Court has generally reviewed a trial judge's decision on the 
issue of attorney fees for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Dixie State Bank v. 
Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988). In light of our opinion in State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994), however, I clarify that the 
reasonableness of an award of attorney fees ordinarily presents a question 
of law, with some measure of discretion given to the trial court in applying 
the reasonableness standard to a given set of facts. 
Defendants believe the same standard applies in the case of the determination of a 
prevailing party, In State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994), the Court ruled that when 
reviewing such an application of the law to the facts in this kind of a case, the review "is 
a determination of law and is reviewable non-deferentially for correctness, as opposed to 
being a fact determination reviewable for clear error." However the Court ruled that the 
"legal standard is one that conveys a measure of discretion to the trial judge when 
applying that standard to a given set of facts." (Id. at 939) 
2. The trial court failed to consider the additional common sense perspective: that 
Plaintiffs originally threatened to bring this action in small claims court; that Plaintiffs 
have a duty to mitigate damages; and that Plaintiffs conscious choice to bring this small 
claims case in the district court maximized the damages inflicted on Defendants by the 
judicial process. Defendants believe that Plaintiffs' choice of forum is an "additional 
common sense perspective" the trial court should have considered as part of its prevailing 
2 
party deliberations which should have resulted in the Defendants being declared the 
prevailing party. 
Standard of review: As a mixed question of law and fact, this issue "presents a 
question of law, with some measure of discretion given to the trial court in applying the 
[common sense] standard to a given set of facts" (Id. at 939) 
3. In addition to the two issues on appeal as articulated, the Appellants ask for 
their attorney fees on appeal. If the Court rules in favor of the Appellants on any of the 
issues raised on appeal, then Appellants are entitled also to an award of attorney fees on 
appeal as a matter of law as articulated by the Court in Management Services Corp. v. 
Development Assocs., 617 P.2d 406 (Utah 1980) (ruling provision in contract providing 
for attorney fees includes attorney fees incurred by the prevailing party on appeal). 
Statement of Preservation of Issues on Appeal 
Defendants appeal from an adverse ruling of the trial court on Defendants' post 
trial motion to be declared the prevailing party. That motion was filed on June 10, 2009 
[R. 442-444], long before the final judgment was entered on September 14, 2009 [R. 550-
551], therefore the issue was timely raised to the trial court. Defendants' Memorandum 
in support of its motion contained "Factual Background for Defendant Motion" parallel 
to the Statement of Relevant Facts appearing below [R. 446-449] and extensive argument 
and citations to the same cases cited herein to support the following arguments: 
POINT 1 PURSUANT TO THE "FLEXIBLE AND REASONED 
APPROACH" FOR DETERMINING THE PREVAILING PARTY 
ADOPTED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT, DEFENDANTS ARE 
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THE PREVAILING PARTIES. [R. 450-454] 
and 
POINT 2: PLAINTIFFS CHOICE TO BRING THIS CASE IN DISTRICT 
COURT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED A FAILURE TO MITIGATE 
DAMAGES WHICH SHOULD BE WEIGHED THE PREVAILING 
PARTY ANALYSIS [R. 454-455] 
These issues therefore were specifically raised and the issues were supported by the trial 
courts own initial findings of fact and supported by the same authorities (not including 
standard of review authorities) cited herein. Therefore, the issues presented to this Court 
were properly raised in the trial court. (See Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 
847 (Utah 1998)) 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
An offer of judgment pursuant to Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is of 
central importance to this appeal. Rule 68 provides as follows: 
Rule 68. Settlement offers. 
(a) Unless otherwise specified, an offer made under this rule is an offer to 
resolve all claims in the action between the parties to the date of the offer, 
including costs, interest and, if attorney fees are permitted by law or contract, 
attorney fees. 
(b) If the adjusted award is not more favorable than the offer, the offeror is not 
liable for costs, prejudgment interest or attorney fees incurred by the offeree after 
the offer, and the offeree shall pay the offeror's costs incurred after the offer. The 
Court may suspend the application of this rule to prevent manifest injustice. 
(c) An offer made under this rule shall: 
(c)(1) be in writing; 
(c)(2) expressly refer to this rule; 
(c)(3) be made more than 10 days before trial; 
(c)(4) remain open for at least 10 days; and 
(c)(5) be served on the offeree under Rule 5. 
Acceptance of the offer shall be in writing and served on the offeror under Rule 5. 
Upon acceptance, either party may file the offer and acceptance with a proposed 
4 
judgment under Rule 58A. 
(d) "Adjusted award" means the amount awarded by the finder of fact and, 
unless excluded by the offer, the offeree's costs and interest incurred before the 
offer, and, if attorney fees are permitted by law or contract and not excluded by the 
offer, the offeree's reasonable attorney fees incurred before the offer. If the 
offeree's attorney fees are subject to a contingency fee agreement, the Court shall 
determine a reasonable attorney fee for the period preceding the offer. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs bought Defendants5 home in Murray, Utah. Over the course of the 
litigation Plaintiffs sued Defendants claiming 15 breaches of the Real Estate Purchase 
Contract between the parties including claims for leaking faucets, missing microwave 
tray, broken sprinklers, missing satellite receivers, broken dishwasher, swapped 
refrigerator, missing home theater components, missing vacuum hoses, missing garage 
door opener, defective cable wiring, and several other claims. By the end of the trial 
Plaintiffs made claims totaling about $24,000.00 plus attorney fees. Before answering 
Plaintiffs' complaint Defendants offered to pay all of Plaintiffs' fees to date to have the 
case re-brought in the small claims court. The offer was rejected. Defendants answered 
without a counterclaim. After initial disclosures Defendants made a Rule 68 offer of 
judgment to Plaintiffs in the amount of $5,000.00. Following substantial discovery and a 
three and a half day bench trial, the trial court awarded Plaintiffs a total of $754.77 on 
two of their 15 claims. Defendants moved to be declared the prevailing party for the 
purposes of the attorney fees clause in the Real Estate Purchase Contract between the 
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parties. The trial court denied the Defendants5 motion. The Court ruled that neither party 
had prevailed and awarded no attorney fees to either side. Defendants have appealed only 
the trial courts denial of their motion to be declared the prevailing party. Defendants also 
seek attorney fees on appeal. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
1. Plaintiffs filed their complaint on August 17, 2005, in the Third Judicial District 
Court for Salt Lake County. [R. 1-22] 
2. Neil Sabin withdrew as counsel for Plaintiffs on September 1, 2005. [R. 29] 
3. Defendants filed their answer with no counterclaim on December 14, 2005. [R. 31] 
4. Plaintiffs served their initial disclosures and filed a certificate of service on 
January 19, 2006 [R. 35], in which Mr. Kenneth Ivory and his associate Kathie Brown 
Roberts, made their appearance as counsel for the Plaintiffs. 
5. Defendants made an offer of judgment of $5,000 pursuant to Rule 68 on February 
1, 2006, and filed their offer of judgment with the court on February 3, 2006. [R. 36] 
6. After extensive discovery and motion practice [R. 40-349], the matter was tried to 
Judge Robert K. Hilder on February 26, 2009, February 27, 2009, and March 6, 2009, 
concluding with closing arguments on March 10, 2009, covering three and one half days 
of trial. [R. 406] 
7. The court issued its 19 page opinion on March 30, 2009, finding for Plaintiffs on 2 
of the 15 claims made by the Plaintiffs and finding for the Defendants on 11 claims made 
by Plaintiffs [R, 406-426], Plaintiffs having failed to put on any evidence as to 1 of the 15 
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claims and having dropped 1 of their 15 claims on the second day of trial. [R. 448-449] 
8. In its ruling and order, the court reserved the issue of attorney fees, and invited the 
Plaintiff to submit an attorney's fee affidavit and memorandum. [R. 424] 
9. Plaintiffs failed to file a motion or affidavit with respect to attorney fees, 
prompting Defendants to file their "Motion for Determination That Defendants Are the 
Prevailing Party . . ." on June 10, 2009. [R. 442-444] 
10. In their June 26, 2009, memorandum in opposition to Defendants' motion, 
Plaintiffs argued that Plaintiffs were the prevailing party [R. 486-494] and next, July 6, 
2009, filed an "Affidavit of Attorney Fees" in an effort to recover some of the $32,673.75 
in attorney fees they claimed were incurred. [R495-499] 
11. In its order styled "Memorandum Decision," dated and entered July 23, 2009, the 
Court denied Defendants' motion and ruled that neither party had prevailed. [R. 516-523] 
12. Plaintiffs then submitted a proposed judgment to counsel which included interest 
on its judgment through August 12, 2009. [R. 528] 
13. Since Defendants objected to the proposed judgment and, because of confusion 
about whether the Memorandum Decision was meant to be a final order or judgment, 
Defendants filed "Defendants Notice of Appeal" on August 20, 2009, appealing only the 
courts denial of Defendants' motion to be declared the prevailing party in the litigation. 
[R. 524-525] 
14. At the same time Defendants filed a "Motion To Amend the Court's Rulings & 
Order And to Make Additional Findings of Fact" asking the trial court to cut off interest 
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accruing on the judgment as of the effective date of the Rule 68 offer of judgment, 
February 6, 2006. [R. 528-529] 
15. On September 14, 2009, the court entered its Ruling and Order [R. 547-549] 
finding Defendants' offer of judgment to be effective to cut off interest as of the date of 
the offer of judgment and signed and entered the proposed judgment submitted to the 
court by Defendants awarding Plaintiff a final and total judgment of $796.33. [R. 550-
551] 
16. The effective date of the Defendants Notice of Appeal became September 14, 
2009, pursuant to Rule 4(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
17. The Utah Supreme Court transferred the appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals 
effective September 20, 2009. [R. 533-534] 
18. The time for filing of a cross-appeal pursuant to Rule 4(d) expired on September 
28, 2009, without the filing of a cross-appeal, thereafter, Plaintiffs' counsel filed a 
"Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel RE: Appeal" on October 5, 2009. 
19. There is no cross-appeal pending before the Court. 
III. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
1. In June 2005, Plaintiff purchased the home of Defendants pursuant to a Real Estate 
Purchase Contract. [R. 407] 
2. On July 17, 2005, Plaintiffs made a demand for the delivery of the vacuum hoses 
which had been part of the whole house vacuum system installed in the home, along with 
a demand for repair or delivery of other items, which the Court found no obligation on the 
8 
part of Defendants. [R 412] 
. iiuii demand, (Defendant - ;i ul cxtuh. • r e t a i l ! threatened as follows: 
i: : do not hear fron 1 you by July 25th, I will be forced to obtain bids tor i.u 
above referenced items and then file suit in small claims Court to collect 
what I am due under the contract. You would be subpoenaed and required 
to appear in Court to tell the judge why you didn't comply with terms of the 
contract you signed, and then order you to pay by Court order. The Court 
would also include additional Court costs to the judgment. I hope we can 
avoid this process and that you will take care of these issues immediately. 
[R.413] 
4. The court found that Defendants removed the vacuum hoses inad\ ertently and 
returned them to Plaintiffs on August 30, 2005, but were responsible for damages 
anyway. [R. 419-420] 
5. Katliei than hi nig then claims in Small ( la in is ( 'ourl as threatened, i .an. .:: 
brought thrii" claim in I >islnrl ( VMIII | \i I | 
6. Out of concern for the potential of a litigation that would be primarily about 
attorney fees, Defendants5 counsel, prior to filing an answer, contacted Plaintiffs5 counsel 
and offered to pay all of Plaintiffs' fees to date in return for dismissal of the case in 
District Court to be rebrought in Small Claims Court. [R. 99] 
7. The offer was rejected. [R. 99] 
8. Plaintiffs claimed 15 separate items of damage against Defendants as first 
enumerated in the document produced by Plaintiffs as Plaintiffs5 calculation of damages, 
pursuant to Plaintiffs Rule 2 0 in u;.; i , M J ^ i . ^ *- .. > ()] 
9 rhat damage calculation produced by Plaintiffs provides as follows [R. 447, 460]: 
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Items quantity price 
Vacuum hose kit 2 537.00 
Attachment set 
Hose sock 
I 25.32 
I 40.81 
Satellite Receivers 3 162.59 
Refrigerator 
Repairs to Dishwasher 1 
repairs to house 
Home Theater System 1 
Surround Sound 
Repair of Sprinklers 
Garage Remote 
Microwave tray 
Food spoilage 
copy& Postage 
Attorney 1 
I 1,458.92 
[ 45.00 
I 4,825.00 
I 2,500.00 
i 1,250.00 
I 395.00 
L 45.00 
[ 35.16 
600.00 
35.00 
1,043.00 
total price 
1074.00 
25.32 
40.81 
487.77 
1,458.92 
45.00 
4,825.00 
2,500.00 
1,250.00 
395.00 
45.00 
35.16 
600.00 
35.00 
1,043.00 
Running 
Total 
1074 
1099.32 
1140.13 
1627.9 
3086.82 
3131.82 
7,956.62 
10456.82 
11706.82 
12101.82 
12146.82 
12181.98 
12781.98 
12816.98 
13859.98 
10. Not including attorneys fees (Plaintiffs last itemized claim), costs of court or 
interest, Plaintiffs' Rule 26 disclosure demand was $12,816.98. [R. 447] 
11. In addition, and newly raised at trial, Plaintiffs claimed in excess of $300 for a 
undelivered mirror [R. 447], and claimed $12,000 for a whole home audio system in lieu 
of Plaintiffs' surround sound claim for $1250 as listed in the Rule 26 disclosures. [R. 
424] 
12. Thus Plaintiffs' total claim, including Rule 26 initial disclosure damage claims of 
$12,816.98, $300 for the mirror, and $12,000 for a surround sound/whole home audio 
system, less the original surround sound claim of $1250, constitutes total damages sought 
by Plaintiffs against Defendants of $23,866.98, not including costs, interest, or attorney 
fees. [R. 448] 
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V After the answer had been filed and the Rule 26 initial disclosures had been made 
• ••;. Plaintiff, Defendants made a fbrmal offer of judgment, pursuant to Rule 68 of the Utah 
February 21 , 2006, a copy of which was filed as part of the record on I ;" sbr i lary 3, 2006 
[R .36 ,37] 
14 As ot the effective date of the Rule 68 Offer of Judgment, the record shows only 
jiii mi; ni()("H»i i il i I i in l»ii u »'' tfiiil 'litanies Ices .ictTuecl ol I IN '» "Hi u , .||n«\ii i 
Plaintiffs' initial disclosure of damages as a claim for "Attorney I " [R. 447, 460] 
15 Mr Ivory's Affidavit of Attorney Fees shows no attorney fees accrued before the 
elTeeliveiiak wl IheRuleON \ ) iki ul Jml^niuit |K -I1)". \m\ 
lb . Mi Ivory's nffidnvil bepin1 \\ if 1 n .illnmev fees ae in in i lor depos 
which did not begin until August 28, 2006, six months after the offer of judgement [R. 
48-49] 
I lis total acci i led fees of $32,673 / 5 [R. :1 96] are fully accounted io; 
the fees claimed for "Depositions" ($14,6 72 50), I rial Pi < ;ps in it u >i is /"C$8, 4 91 25),, j u .< 1 
"Trial Related Matters" ($9,550.00). [R. 496-498] 
Defendants have acknowledged from the beginning that Plaintiffs were likely to 
have a small recover) , and that the issue 1 las been attorney s fees from the beginning, as 
Defendants explicitly expressed in their Memorandum in Opposition to 1}sunlit - - M \ 
for Protective Order: 
After a later failed attempt at a settlement conference, Defendants made an 
11 
offer of judgment for $5,000 being $3,000 over counsels estimate of 
probable outcome but reflecting the costly nature of trying this case. That 
offer was rejected. Defendants recognize Plaintiff is likely to recover 
several hundred dollars on the substance of their claim. The major exposure 
is attorney fees. [R. 99, 449] 
19. After substantial discovery and motion practice and a 3 lA day bench trial, the court 
awarded Plaintiffs $359.77 on their the vacuum hose claim, and $395 on their sprinkling 
system claim for a total award of $754.77, not including costs of court, interest, and 
attorneys fees. [R. 420-421] 
20. In the court's detailed 19-page Ruling and Order, including extensive findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, integrated by subject matter, the court ruled as follows: 
Item 
Satellite receivers 
Attachment set 
Hose sock 
Garage remote 
Mirror 
Repairs dishwasher 
Refrigerator 
Food spoilage 
Repairs to house 
Vacuum hose kit 
Microwave tray 
Repair of sprinklers 
Home theater system 
Claim 
$487.77 
$25.32 
$40.81 
$45 
$300 
$45 
$1458.92 
$600 
$4825 
$1074 
$35.16 
$395 
$2500 
Award 
$0 claim denied 
$0 claim denied 
$0 claim denied 
$0 claim denied 
$0 claim denied 
$0 claim denied 
$0 claim denied 
$0 claim denied 
$0 claim denied 
$359.77 
Dropped claim at trial 
$395 
$0 claim denied 
Record 
R.413 1 
R. 414 
R.414 1 
R. 413-414 
R.415 
R.416 
R.417 
R.417 
R. 418-419 
R. 420 
R. 413 
R. 421 
R. 422 
12 
Surround sound 
Copies and postage 
$1250/$12000 
$35 
$0 claim denied R. 422-424 
No evidence at trail Not Mentioned 
.he court ihvi.iioned in its 
findings of fact, awarded 1/3 of another, and found Ww ihr DIT»MI<I:UIIS mi il il ml P|,tm|iik 
claims. [See chart above, R. 406-426] 
22, The court noted that Defendants had dropped an additional one of the M 
mentioned claims di iring the trial [R 1 13] (I 'laintiffs failed to pi it < : m> e\ iduice as to 
the claim for copies and postage which was not discussed in the finding ut hu ' ). 
23. The total claims actually addressed in the Ruling and Order were $23,866.98 less 
$35 for the copies and postage claim, bringing the total claim specifically addressed by 
1 hec< i iri 1 .< > $23,831 98 [Set < ;1 .; ir I al x > \ < ,R 1 18] • 
Not including cost of court, interest, and attorneys fees, the court awarded 
Plaintiffs less than 3.2% of their total claims for damage against Defendants and 16% of 
the an 101 n it offered by Defendants ii I their Offer of J udgment made 3 and lA years earlier. 
[See chart above, R 448] 
25, In the courts first post trial finding and order (Ruling and Order dated Mach 30, 
2009) the court made the following comments regarding attorney fees: 
The Real Estate Purchase Contract has an attorney's fee provision. It 
awards fees to the prevailing party. In this case, Plaintiffs have prevailed on 
two very small items out of a total claim that has changed greatly over the 
course of the action, but that was between approximately $10,000 and 
$?0 000 over the course of the case and the trial. In other words, Plaintiffs 
prevailed minimally, or perhaps they lost silbstantially. I have considered 
13 
not awarding fees to either side, but I will give Plaintiffs a chance to 
present an Attorney's Fee Affidavit strictly allocating the fees necessary to 
prove the two claims on which they have prevailed. I will consider that 
claim, along with any opposition from Defendants, before I make a final 
decision on attorney's fees. [R. 424] 
26. Plaintiffs did not file the affidavit the trial court allowed it to file, leading 
Defendants to file their motion to be declared the prevailing party. [R. 446] 
27. Defendants argued that Defendants should be declared the prevailing party since 
Plaintiffs sought to recover $23,866.98 in damages plus attorney fees from Defendants, 
while Defendants did not file a counterclaim but instead sought to give Plaintiffs a 
judgment of $5,000 by their Rule 68 offer of judgment, and, in the end, after the travail 
of discovery and 3 lA days of trial Plaintiffs only recovered an award of $754.77, 16% of 
the judgment originally offered. [R. 458] 
28. Defendants also argued that Defendants should be declared the prevailing party 
because the Plaintiffs, having control of where the case was brought, caused the attorney 
fees damages to all the parties by bringing the case in district court and then refused the 
offer of Defendants to have fees paid to date and have the case rebrought in small claims 
court. [R. 458] 
29. The court denied an attorney fees award to either Plaintiffs or Defendants ruling: 
When the Court weighs and considers the relative "victories" in this case, 
that Plaintiffs prevailed on two claims and Defendants successfully 
defended the majority of the claims. Ultimately the results of this case are a 
pyrrhic victory for both sides. Such a victory does not equate to genuine 
success or prevailing. This was a relatively simple case that could and 
should have been resolved in far fewer than four years and with far fewer 
14 
iiunless activities. Plaintiffs only prevailed on vacuum, hoses and sprinkler 
irs for minimal amounts. [R. 521; 
accruing on the award of 
$754.77 as of February 6, 2006, the effective date of Defendants' Rule M offer I 
judgment awarding Plaintiffs a total judgment of $796.33. [R. 547] 
S U M M A R Y OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellate Courts have directed the trial courts as follows: 
We directed Utah courts to employ f,fa flexible and reasoned approach to 
deciding in particular cases who actually is the prevailing party/" [Citations 
omitted]. Furthermore, "[a] key part of the flexible approach" involves 
using "common sense" to "look at the amounts actually sought and then 
balance them proportionally with what was recovered " ( J pochynok Co. v. 
Smedsrud, 2003 UT App 375, f 12, 80 P.3d 563.) 
Plaintiffs sought an award against Defendants at trial of $23,831,9S in : \ separate claims. 
I )den<i.tnls made no counterclaim. Rather, as the trial court found,, the Defendants had 
made a valid rule 68 offer of iiulmncnl in 111*' .iiiiuijtul ol !V\I)IH) <il .iri iniluil slagc ol Ilk 
case. The court articulated in a rough way why Plaintiffs cannot be considered to hr- . 
prevailed iien the Court weighs and considers the relative "victories" in this case, 
That Plainii1'*•• -*rv\ idled on \\\u claims and 1 )elendants successfully defended the majority 
oftheclaims."[R. 52ij "Ultimately the Court awarded Nnmfifls ;J nid^meiil ofT7C*4 ?"' 
on two of their claims."[R. 520] "Such a victory does not equate to genuine success or 
prevailing. \i\ \ 
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The court, however, does not weigh, balance, or explain why successfully 
defending 12 claims to $0.00 awards, defending one claim to 1/3rd of its alleged value, 
losing completely only one small claim for $395.00, defeating 97% of Plaintiffs claimed 
damages and finishing the litigation with a judgment of only 16% of the judgment 
offered to the Plaintiffs at the outset of the litigation does not constitute genuine success. 
The trial court failed to use "common sense" to "look at the amounts actually sought and 
then balance them proportionally with what was recovered" when it comes to Defendants 
success at trial. Rather the court seized upon factors outside of what was sought and 
what was recovered, (i.e. the futility of the discovery process) to conclude that the 
successful defense by Defendants was somehow not genuine. Thus the court apparently 
wrongly used facts relevant only to the courts future deliberation on reasonable attorney 
fees, and not those prescribed by the law for determination of prevailing party. Neither 
did the court consider that Plaintiffs first threatened to bring the case in small claims 
court and then rejected Defendants offer to pay all fees to date and have the case 
rebrought and tried in small claims court. In doing so Plaintiffs caused the case to 
become a financial disaster for all parties in violation of Plaintiffs obligation to mitigate 
damages. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT CORRECTLY APPLY THE "FLEXIBLE 
APPROACH" IN DETERMINING THE PREVAILING PARTY IN THAT THE 
COURT DID NOT CONDUCT A "COMMON SENSE5' "BALANCING" OF THE 
"AMOUNTS SOUGHT AND WON BY EACH PARTY." 
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A. Standard of Review 
I lie I Juili Supreme (Joint in Stale \\ Pena, W) I1,id 9 *>2 i I Jiah 1994) adopted a 
more variable view of appellate deference alio \* ed t : tl le ti ial coi it 1: in an appellate • 
review. The Court noted that the extremes of the spectrum of deference are: 1) pur e 
findings of fact which the appellate courts will give the trial court maximum deference 
an i v v ill 11 : 11 e\ erse • C M * ,: ;': excep; m the case < . iear error," (Id. m %- o-936) and 
z.) pure questions of law for which th 
court will review "de novo." (Id. at 936) The innovation of the Pena decision comes in 
the recognition that the deference given to a trial court on review of decisions involving 
iiiiu:tl qurslions nil Ian u I aie illusions ol law ami ire viewable on a correctness 
standard but with a sliding scale of deference to the I n a 1 1111111 111 a 11 () 1 y 1111" 111«' 11 • i n 1111 
facts. (Id. at 939) (The spectrum of discretion is based upon a number of factors (Id. at 
lM>:v(j.)fi), When condensed down, the major factor amounts to an evaluation of the 
relative advantajv Ihe (rial i until hn\ ovvi lim- appellor o nil lu t"\alttak' lla- tuniplcxih 
of the issue. This variability of appellate deference not only appears between different 
kinds of legal questions (such as sufficiency of evidence to grant a new trial which are 
given a. hnjti level nl discretion . wheitiei <i municipal function" has been delegated to 
a state commission in violation of the 1 Hah ('onshlnliun w hieli an: icviewed al an almost 
de novo level (Id. at 938)), but substantial variability of appellate deference has been 
found by the Court within the same legal question, depending on the relative superiority 
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of the trial court to evaluated the situation. In the Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890 
(Utah 1996), the Supreme Court noted: 
In light of our opinion in State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994), 
however, I clarify that the reasonableness of an award of attorney fees 
ordinarily presents a question of law, with some measure of discretion 
given to the trial court in applying the reasonableness standard to a given 
set of facts. See id... Nevertheless, this case is different from most 
attorney fee cases in that the circuit Court judge who heard Salmon's two 
misdemeanor trials did not make the fee award decision. Instead, the fee 
award decision was made by a district court judge who had before him only 
a written record and oral argument. Therefore, this Court has before it 
everything relied upon by the Court below. Accordingly, there is no 
justification for any deference to the trial court because it was not 
advantaged in any way in the fact-finding process. 
Where the trial court is in no better position to evaluate the facts than the appellate court, 
no deference was given the lower court's decision. Presumably this sliding scale will be 
applied on a case by case basis depending on the issue and the relative superiority of the 
trial court to evaluate the relevant variables. 
B. Prevailing Party Determination 
On the issue of a trial court's determination of the prevailing party, the Utah 
appellate Courts, starting with the Court of Appeals, saw the "the need for a flexible and 
reasoned approach to deciding in particular cases who actually is the prevailing party" 
(Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 776 P.2d 643, 650 n.7 (Ct. App. 1989) and 
Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 557 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
After fleshing out the concept in a number of cases, this Court, in J. Pochynok Co. v. 
Smedsrud, 2003 UT App 375, \ 12, 80 P.3d 563 directed the use of the flexible and 
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reasoned approach as follows: 
^ e ( | | rec | :ec | jji^ c o u r t s to employ '"a flexible and reasoned approach to 
deciding in particular cases who actually is the prevailing party."' [Citations 
omitted]. Furthermore, ,f[a] key part of the flexible approach involves using 
"common sense11 to "look at the amounts actually sought and then balance 
them proportionally with what was recovered." 
The same process and principle was affirmed by the Supreme Court inJ. Pochynok Co. i\ 
SiiiL'tUiiki urns wr Y)^\2i, i \u \>.M\ .\$V. 
In order to apply the flexible and reasoned approach in this case . . . the w uu 
court should have made findings regarding the amounts sought and won by 
each party[, and] should then have conducted a common sense inquiry and 
balancing in regard to who was the successful, party. 
*-. * : w.i. tne trial court did nof follow the process mandated in the 
cases above, insk ?<! **K -+ on- . ;.. > e 1.9 page fliiciii lgs of fact made ii 1 
its original trial ruling with respect to amounts actually sought, and then didn't "conduct 
a common sense inquiry and balancing" failing to balance the "amounts actually sought" 
"propor tionally w it! 1 w\ mt was i c: co v ei eel " R athei , the ti ial coui t focused on language of 
the cases that grant discretion to the trial courts in nmiplrx nisrs msnls mi1 nnilii|ili 
parties and multiple claims to sort out the complexities of what was sought by the parties 
in such, cases by using "additional common sense perspectives." But the trial court did 
quite the opposite: "This was a relatively simple case that could and should have been 
resolved in far fewer than four years and with far fewer fruitless activities." Rather than 
analyze ' "amounts actually sought'' ai id "balance them proportionally" using "common 
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sense," the trial court seems to have focused on the futility of the vigorous litigation 
process in light of the trivial amount recovered to determine that no party was genuinely 
successful. 
As the legal basis for its ruling, the trial court cited the Court of Appeals for the 
proposition that a trial court may determine that neither party prevailed: 
"The facts and circumstances surrounding a determination of prevailing 
party status vary widely. Because of those variances, we believe it entirely 
appropriate, when adequately supported by the facts, to conclude . . . that 
there is no prevailing party." A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. 
Guy, 2002 UT App 73, f 18, 47 P.3d 92. (R520) 
Whipple is the seminal case standing for the proposition that a trial court can 
declare a litigation a "draw." The Utah Supreme Court in Whipple Plumbing v. Aspen 
Construction, 2004 UT 47,111, 94 P.3d 270 instructs trial courts what they should not 
do: "Courts should not ignore common sense when deciding which party prevailed." 
Quoting the language of the Court of Appeals in A K Whipple (A.K. & R. Whipple 
Plumbing & Heating v. Guy, 2002 UT App 73, ^ 19, 47 P.3d 92 the Supreme Court also 
instructs trial courts what they should do: "[look] at the amounts actually sought and then 
[balance] them proportionally with what was recovered." Though the appellate Court 
seemed disappointed in the amount of analysis the trial court had done, the trial court in 
Whipple did meet the minimum required analysis and balancing: 
The Court feels where Plaintiff was claiming roughly $ 13,000 on the 
Thayne's Canyon property (allowing for the $ 17,000 already paid), and 
where Defendant was claiming roughly $25,000 in damages for the 
negligence of the Plaintiff, and further where the net recovery is only $527, 
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the Court is of the opinion that this is essentially a "draw" and no attorney's 
fees should be awarded. (Id. at 23) 
reviewed the history of the "flexible" approach and, in particular, its decision in Whipple: 
Furthermore, "[a] key part of the flexible approach" involves using 
"common sense" to "look[] at the amounts actually sought and then balance 
them proportionally with what was recovered." On this reasoning we 
affirmed the trial court's determination that neither party was the successful 
party under the mechanics' liens statute. 
The Supreme Court, after scrutinizing the Court of Appeals ruling stated: 
The court of appeals, after using the net judgment as a starting point, 
carefully weighed the relative success of the parties on their competing 
claims, balancing the amounts each party sought with the amounts each 
party recovered. The court of appeals thus correctly applied the flexible and 
reasoned approach to determining the successful party under section 38-1-
18 of the Utah Code. Affirmed. {Whipple Plumbing v. Aspen Construction, 
2004 UT 47, If 32, 94 P.3d 270.) 
Note that the Supreme Court expressly approved the almost de novo "[careful 
weighing]" of the "relative success of tt le parties on their competing claims" done by the 
Court of Appeals in the matter along with the appellate "balanch ig the ai noi iiits each 
party sought with the amounts each party recovered." In the case where the trial court 
had done a minimal job of balancing to support its ruling that the trial was a "draw," the 
Supreme Court does not seem to give the trial coi irt a lot of deferei ice. Defendai its 
believe that the trial court in this case should be granted very little deference relating to 
the weighing and balancing portion of the process for the same reasons. 
vV ith respect to the determination of the prevailing party, the obligation of the trial 
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court is clear. The court must start with an analysis of the "amounts actually sought by 
each party." In the trial court's ruling on Defendants' prevailing party motion, the trial 
court made only the most general summary of its previous findings regarding the amounts 
Plaintiffs "actually sought." The court stated: 
This case was filed in August 2005, and Plaintiffs asserted at least the 
eleven claims that were eventually brought to trial and asked for thousands 
in damages and fees. [R. 520] 
In the 19-page ruling on Plaintiffs' claims, the court had specifically addressed in detail 
the merits or condition of 14 separate claims involving demands that amounted to 
$23,831.98. In addition Plaintiffs' sought interest and attorney fees of approximately 
$32,600. It is apparent that the court, by stating that "Plaintiffs . . . asked for thousands 
in damages and fees," wasn't trying to make a careful analysis of what the Plaintiffs 
actually sought but was making a general reference to the court's very thorough findings 
of fact made in its initial Ruling and Order. Since this finding is a mere summary of its 
more extensive findings, this finding should be reviewed de novo. The findings about 
what was sought and what was won that should be given broad discretion by the 
Appellate Court are found in the trial court's original "Ruling and Order." 
Plaintiffs filed a complaint without stating a specific amount of damages. [R. 6] 
As part of their initial disclosures, Plaintiffs disclosed damage claims of $12,816.98 not 
including their claim for attorney fees. The court allowed Plaintiffs to raise additional 
claims at trial. The first was a claim for a mirror. In Defendants' memorandum in 
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support of the motion at issue, Defendants stated the claimed value of the mirror, as 
counsel remembered it from trial, at "in excess of $300."[R. 447] Neither the court i IOI 
the Plaintiff lodge d an] disagreen ; number. I he court did not mention the 
alleged value of the mirror but 11 id speeifienlU deny lite < l.iim fm Ihc inn 101 [R 114-
415] I he major addition to Plaintiffs' claims at trial was a claim for $12,000.00 for a 
whole house audio system in the guise of a claim for a surround sound system. This 
surround sound system "... that they should receive a system vali led from $8,000 to 
$12,000."[R. 424] A claim of $12,000 was used in lieu of Plaintiffs' surround sound 
claim for $1250 as listed in their initial disclosures. Plaintiffs' total claim addressed by 
Ilk1 ITKIIII n i n i i l ui ii i m l u i l In id i i i i ' s , i n c l u d e d ll'tte i i u d . i l d r , c . - > .:.. - an i r -
$12,816.98, less Plaintiffs claim for $35.00 for copies and postage not ra^eu :\: 
mentioned by the court in its ruling, plus $300 for the mirror; and $12,000 for a whole 
home audio system, less the original surround sound claim of $ 1250. The total damages 
..ought hv Plaintiffs against Dclciulanls were $23,831.^8, mil including costs, inteivsi, or 
attorney fees. 
Let us move to the issue of the amount the Defendants' actually sought. Instead of 
filing a counterclain I asking the court to awai d Defendants a judgment, Defendants did 
the opposite, they filed an offer to have a ji ldgment taken against them ii I the an ioi n it of 
$5,000. The court so found. After stating that the Plaintiff "asked for thousands in 
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damages" the court found that "defendants... made a Rule 68 Offer of Judgment for 
$5,000 in February 2006."[R. 517] Later, the court made a finding that Defendants' offer 
of judgment pursuant to rule 68 was a valid one when the court, on motion of the 
Defendants, cut off interest on Plaintiffs' judgment as of the effective date of the offer of 
judgment. Defendants believe that the court found Defendants "actually sought" to give 
the Plaintiffs a judgment for $5,000. 
Not referenced in the trial courts' findings is the fact that Defendants 
acknowledged in writing to the court at an early stage that "Defendants recognize 
Plaintiff is likely to recover several hundred dollars on the substance of their claim. The 
major exposure is attorney fees." [R. 99, 449] 
An offer of judgment pursuant to Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is 
not just another settlement offer. It is a court sanctioned formal procedure for declaring 
what you seek to give the Plaintiff, is binding upon the Defendant, if accepted, as a 
judgment of the court, and is a rule of law adopted by the Court to effect the award of 
attorney fees, interest, and costs in order to encourage settlement, and to cut the litigation 
process short. As the trial court correctly pointed out, Defendants are not entitled to an 
award of attorney fees on the basis of an offer of judgment alone, but that doesn't mean 
the court should not consider it in the balancing process. 
Once the trial court has carefully analyzed "amounts actually sought" by the 
parties, the court is bound to "then [balance] them proportionally with what was 
recovered." (J. Pochynok Co. v. Smedsrud, 2003 UT App 375, \ 12, 80 P.3d 563 ) The 
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Ii iial court did not acknowledge an obligation to do a proportional balancing, but the court 
. . . Plaintiffs asserted at least the eleven claims that were eventually 
brought to trial and asked for thousands in damages and fees... Ultimately 
the Court awarded Plaintiffs a judgment of $754 ~~ -i t\\. • < >f their claims. 
When the Court weighs and considers the relati\ L V atones in this case, 
that Plaintiffs prevailed on two claims and Defendants successfully 
defended the majority of the claims. 
Such a victory does not equate to genuine success or prevailing. This was a 
relatively simple case that could and should have been resolved in far fewer 
than four years and with far fewer fruitless activities. Plaintiffs only 
prevailed on vacuum hoses and sprinkler repairs for minimal amounts.[R. 
520-S911 
)efendants' ! 
more complete analysis of this case: 
In this case, Plaintiffs have prevailed on two very small claims out of a total 
claim that has changed greatly over the course of the action, but that was 
between approximately $10000 and $20000 over the course of the case and 
trial. In other words, Plaintiffs prevailed minimally, or perhaps they lost 
substantially. [R. 424] 
The foregoing finding that Plaintiffs "lost substantially" occurred before Defendants' 
motion and before the court was aware of Defendants' Rule 68 offer of judgment. The 
Court, however does not weigh, balance, or explain ,vh\ successfully defending 12 
claims to $0.00 awards, defending one claim to 1/3rd of its alleged value, losing 
completely only one small claim for $395.00, defeating 97% of Plaintiffs claimed 
damages and finishing the litigation with a judgment of only 16% of the judgment 
offered to tl le I 'laintiffs at the oi itset oft! le litigatioi I does i lot coi istitute genuine success. 
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Defendants did not fail to prove a counterclaim as was the case in Whipple. There is no 
countervailing failure on the part of the Defendants to constitute a "draw," as the Whipple 
trial court found. If Plaintiffs "lost substantially," with no countervailing failure on the 
part of the Defendants to tip the scale back to a draw, doesn't a substantial loss on the 
part of the Plaintiffs equate to a common sense substantial win on the part of the 
Defendants. 
What this Court required the trial court to do was a common sense proportional 
balancing. If the Plaintiffs in this "relatively simple case" had been awarded $23,077.21 
(Just $754.77 short of the $23,831.98 they sought), would the trial court, exercising 
"common sense" have failed to find Plaintiffs were the prevailing party? 
IL TRIAL COURTS SHOULD CONSIDER PLAINTIFFS' CHOICE OF FORUM 
WHEN DETERMINING THE PREVAILING PARTY, BUT SHOULD NOT 
CONSIDER REASONABLENESS OF ATTORNEY FEES ISSUES 
In Pena {State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994).), the supreme court borrowed a 
metaphor of a fenced pasture as descriptive of the amount of deference given to a trial 
court on any given issue or set of facts. In the cases where the appellate court grants the 
trial court broad discretion, such as many evidentiary matters, the trial court runs free in a 
large pasture. In other issues the pasture may be very small. (Id. at 938). The appellate 
court will examine the decisions of the trial court to see if the court has hopped an 
existing fence or, if appropriate, the appellate court may "[feel] comfortable in more 
closely defining the law by fencing off a part of the pasture previously available." (Id. at 
938). "As can be imagined, the real amount of pasture permitted a trial judge will vary 
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depending on the legal issue ' "  (Id. at 938) I he size of the pasture in which the trial court' 
runs ill a prevailing p*ni\ tit * i m ii I• s 1 • iinl L ni » aidit(l«, Avlhn A I• 111 i piohalil, «««l 
medium size, comparable to that of the issue of the reasonableness of attorney fees, "a 
question of law, with some measure of discretion given to the trial court in applying the 
reasonableness slundaid lo a given set of facts." Salmon v. Davis ('ounty, (H6 P.2d 890 
(Utah 1996). In tl le ii istant case the coi n t mi ist appl> the li" 'com moi i sei ise" standard to tl i.e 
facts. Defendants believe that the pasture size will very depending upon the complexity 
of the case. In Radman v. Flanders Corp., 2007 UT App 351, ^ f 26, 172 P.3d 668, this 
C 3i ii t indicated that con lplicated cases, , ii I v ol ving mi iltiple parties and claims, may 
require the Court to give substantial deference u 
This Court has previously noted the difficulty in determining which party 
prevails in complicated cases involving multiple claims and parties. 
1 1 le • trial coi u I: ha s ri lied that this is a ' 'relatively simple case." In a case of simple breach 
of contract or 15 claims of hwiw h ol ., »»nlitn I \> illi im • i.iinlercliiims the pasture iii \< \\u Ii 
the trial court runs should be considered small. Defendants believe the trial court in this 
case has crossed the fence into an adjoining pasture, that of the determination of the 
reasonableness of attorne)' fees, as it focused on the relationship of the litigation effort to 
the amount recovered instead of staying in the pasture of "common sense" propoi tioi ial 
balancing of what was sought with what was won. Defendants find no case law 
supporting the kind of analysis done by the trial court. If this Court is going to consider 
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forum as a more logical and more helpful precedent in the prevailing party deliberation. 
Defendants frankly admit that they find no supporting case law to the effect that not 
bringing a small claims case in small claims court should be considered in the prevailing 
party deliberation. 
The trial court did find that "This was a relatively simple case that could and 
should have been resolved in far fewer than four years and with far fewer fruitless 
activities."[R. 521] The court further stated: "Ultimately the results of this case are a 
pyrrhic victory for both sides." [R. 521] Small claims court would have certainly met the 
court's concern. Small claims court would not have injected the issue of attorney fees 
into this litigation as the driving factor. The parties could have represented themselves 
with relaxed evidence rules and no discovery. All parties would have been far better off, 
no matter what the result, and the victory of Plaintiff or Defendant would not have been 
what the court called "pyrrhic." The advice of Abraham Lincoln to lawyers is insightful 
here: 
Discourage litigation. Persuade your neighbors to compromise whenever 
you can. Point out to them how the nominal winner is often a real loser — in 
fees, expenses, and waste of time. As a peacemaker the lawyer has a 
superior opportunity of being a good man. There will still be business 
enough. 
Abraham Lincoln, Fragment: Notes for a Law Lecture, in 2 
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 82 (Rutgers 
University Press, 1953). Available at 
http://quod.lib.umich.edu/l/lincoln/. 
When Plaintiffs decided to bring their $800 case in district court they brought disaster 
upon Defendants and themselves, but it was their choice. Defendants' counsel did not 
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need this business. When Plaintiffs rejected the offer of Defendants' counsel to pay 
I Halt itiffs' fees to date ai ldi no < re tl: le ease to small claims court. P:.^nuii^ again ..hose 
disaster. 
The derivation of the courts phrase "pyrrhic victory" is illustrative of the 
difference in the position of a Plaintiff and a Defendant in this kind of conflict. Pyrrhus, 
ntln i»l I'piius, in lliL1. campaign in Italy, altatkcii Asuilnin in ?7() 1KT. He won the 
battle but took heavy casualties. I b one who was grv ing hlii 1 congi ati llatioi is oi 11: lis 
victory, he is reported to have commented, "If we are victorious in one more battle with 
the Romans, we shall be utterly ruined." (Plutarch, Life of Pyrrhus, 21:8) Pyrrhus was 
the aggressor, the invader, the Plaintiff if ;; c i i \\ ill I he pi: u ase coi Ud • m< e 
apropos to the Plaintiffs who reportedly incurred $32,600 in attorney i ! R. l! ;^ i D 
achieve a final judgment of $796.33, especially when Defendants had already offered to 
surrender and give the Plaintiffs Judgment of $5,000 at the outset. [R 36-37] 
Bi it the Defendai its" perspective is ecu npletely differei it If the ecu n ts' in lplication 
is that getting caught up in this litigation was an unmitigated disaster for the Defendants, 
the Defendants certainly agree. But Defendants did not start the battle and once started, 
Defendants did every thing they could think of to stop the litigation at its outset 
including: return of the vacuum hoses- of KM
 ;> n;i\ - : ,, itiffs fees to date and have the 
case moved to small claims court; and, lastly, offer a judgment 6 time higher than the 
damages actually owed. A defendant (without a counterclaim) in our legal system has no 
::,!: loice as to whe n, vvl lei e , oi if, tl le battle is engaged and have few tools at their disposal 
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to fend off a senseless financial blood bath against a wealthy or enraged Plaintiff. One of 
those few tools is the Rule 68 offer of judgment. It communicates defendant's last best 
offer, the one the defendant will stand upon after trial to determine fees, costs, and 
interest. Another tool should be a stated obligation of plaintiffs to bring small claims 
matters in small claims court. That obligation will have teeth only if the appellate courts 
of this state instruct the trial courts to consider plaintiffs' poor choice of forums as a 
balancing factor in the prevailing party decision. 
Before finishing Defendants argument, Defendants feel the need to address a 
factual issue implied in the trial courts ruling. In its rulings with respect to the prevailing 
party, the court stated: 
. . . the parties conducted discovery, fought about discovery, fought more 
about discovery, and argued to the point where the Court granted Plaintiffs' 
motion for a protective order and ordered the parties to conduct depositions 
supervised by the Court. In February and March 2009, this case came on for 
four days of trial. Ultimately the Court awarded Plaintiffs a judgment of 
$754.77 on two of their claims. [R520] 
Though the court in its Memorandum Decision appealed from makes no findings 
of fact with regard to discovery abuses, the language does imply such. The court notes in 
its ruling that the "Court granted Plaintiffs' motion for a protective order and ordered the 
parties to conduct depositions supervised by the Court." The implication is that Plaintiffs 
were successful in their claims of discovery abuse against Defendants. The record shows 
differently. As to supervised depositions the Defendants, in their Memorandum in 
opposition [R. 323], stipulated to the advisability of supervised depositions: 
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If the Defendants thought the Court had the time to spare, Defendants 
would welcome the supervision of the deposition of Mr 11ind, primarily 
for the protection of Mr. Lund 
As to \hc ivsur oi lighting over discovery, the record shows substantial battles over 
discovery including: 
A motion by Plaintiffs asking for a protective order limiting the time of the 
deposition of Plaintiff, Mrs Olsen to 2 hours. [R. 58] 
A motion by Defendants to Compel Discovery of financial information, and 
inspection of the home with Defendants' present. [R. 135] 
A motion by Plaintiffs for a protective order seeking to prevent Defendants 
from attending the inspection. [R. 171] 
A motion by Plaintiffs for sanctions under rule 37 for accusing Defendant 
Neil Lund of refusing to testify at his deposition and for "Defendants' 
pattern of Discovery Abuse" and for supervised depositions. [R. 235-236] 
The foregoing motions were set for a "Hearing on All Motions" [R. 334-336] on 
February 5, 2007[R. 337-338]. The court, in its notes regarding the decision, ruled as 
follows: 
Court ordered Mr. Ivory to be present as a representative at 30 minute, 
house inspection [with Defendants present], Deft may make claims for 
attorney fees without amending complaint. Court ordered case continued 
for depositions to be supervised by Court. Court ordered document 
production under protective order. Mr. Newton [attorney for Defendants] 
to prepare order. [R. 337] 
Plaintiffs request for attorney fees for discovery abuse was denied. Taking all of 
the motions into account, the court compelled the refused discovery requested by 
Defendants with limitations, and had Defendants' counsel prepare the final order, 
indicating that, taken together, Defendants were the prevailing parties in the discovery 
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motions. Defendants do not believe these issues are relevant to the issues on appeal but 
have briefly addressed the back handed implications of the language used by the court. If 
this Court wishes to investigate this issue more fully, the full contents of all the motions 
are available in the record on appeal beginning at page 54 and running through page 358, 
and Defendants' arguments therein, in light of the final results of this case., are very 
instructive. If the Court is inclined to such a review, that review should be a de novo one 
since the trial court had no more insight into the motions at the time they were argued 
than the Court of Appeals. If Defendants are declared the prevailing party these issues 
will be properly reviewed in detail by the trial court in process of Defendants' application 
for reasonable attorney fees. 
III. IF DEFENDANTS PREVAIL ON APPEAL THEY ARE ENTITLED TO 
THEIR ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
In addition to the issues on appeal as articulated above, the Defendamts seek their 
attorney fees on appeal. The trial court has found that there is an attorney fees provision 
in the Real Estate Purchase Contract at dispute in this case. Where the contract in dispute 
contains an attorneys fees provision that provision also entitles the prevailing party on 
appeal to their attorney fees. (Management Services Corp. v. Development Assocs., 617 
P.2d 406 (Utah 1980).) If the Court rules for Defendants in this appeal, then Defendants 
are entitled also to an award of attorney fees on appeal as a matter of law and Defendants 
request that the Court of Appeals remand the issue of reasonable attorney fees on appeal 
to the trial court for determination. 
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CONCLUSION 
If a trial court can declare this simple case a "draw," where there is no coi inte r 
n laini, where Ddrndmir. dOV.ilrrl 07% of I'liiinhl'IV daimal diiiiiiipcs, w IK/IT flu liiml 
judgment is l/6th of the Rule 68 offer of judgment made by Defendants at the initial 
stages of the case, then trial courts in this state will be free to award no attorney fees to 
either party in nearly every case tried in the State of ! Jtah, based i ipon the ti ial coi ir ts 
displeasure with at ly aspect of the litigation, attheii discretion Defendants believe this is 
not the intent of the flexible and reasoned approach pioneered by this Court. 
Dated this / ^ d a y of February, 2010. 
BUSINESS I ] W ASSOCIATES, I .('. 
J. Steven Newton 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANTS were mailed 
postage prepaid thereon to: 
Thomas & Nancy Olsen 
791 Germania Avenue 
Murray, Utah 84107 
This 16th day of February, 2010. 
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ADDENDUM 
I ab A Exhibit A of Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion 
for Determination that Defendants are the Prevailing Parties... 
Tab B Ruling and Order dated March 30, 2009 
Tab C The Memorandum Decision dated July 23, 2009 
Tab D The final Judgment dated September 
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Tah 
Items quantity price total price 
Vacumm hose kit 2 537.00 
Atachment set 
Hose Sock 
Satellite Recievers < 
Refridgerator 
Repairs to Dishwasher 
repairs to house 
Home Theater System 
Surround Sound 
Repair of Sprinkelers 
Garage Remote 
Microwave tray 
Food spoilage 
copy & Postage 
Attourny 1 
25 32 
I 40 81 
\ 162 59 
I 1,458.92 
I 45.00 
I 4,825.00 
I 2,500.00 
I 1,250.00 
I 395.00 
1 45 00 
1 35 16 
600 00 
35 00 
1,043 00 
1,074.00 
25.32 
40 81 
487 77 
1,458 92 
45 00 
4,825.00 
2,500.00 
1,250.00 
395.00 
45 00 
35.16 
600.00 
35 00 
1,043 00 
Running Total 
1074 
1099.32 
1140 13 
1627 9 
3086.82 
3131.82 
7,956.82 
10456.82 
11706.82 
12101.82 
12146.82 
12181.98 
12781.98 
12816 98 
13859.98 
A) 
£ 
FYf f lRTT A 
TabB 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISPWRfUudiclal District 
ill AMI.) f'QIf HALT LARK ' 'OUNTY , STATE OF UTAH MAR 3 0 2009 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
*f -—^ &-
Oeputy Clerk 
THOMAS OLSEN and NANCY OLSEN, $ RULING AND ORDER 
Plaintiffs, : CASE Nd 050914481 
vs. t 
NEIL LUND and SUSAN LUND, t Judge Hobert K , Hilrtei 
Defendants* i 
This case was tried to the Court on February 26 and 27, and March 
6,2009, and closing arguments were presented to the Court on March 10, 
2009. Plaintiffs were represented by Mr. Kenneth Ivory, Defendants were 
represented by Mr. J. Steven Newton. Following argument, the Court took 
the matter under advisement. Now, having considered all of the 
testimony, exhibits, applicable law and arguments of counsel, the Court 
enters the following, ruling* 
Following a general introductory section, I have organized the 
ruling by subject matter, because I believe it is the most effective way 
to address the varied issues in this case. While each section is stated 
in narrative form, it is my intention to include within that narrative 
sufficient findings of fact to support the conclusions of law that I 
reached with regard to each claim. 
As a preliminary matter I address plaintiffs' efforts to urge some 
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amendments to conform to the evidence, and assertion of new legal 
theories, e.g. conversion, near the end of trial. Because I believe I 
have considered all of plaintiffs claims in light of all applicable 
theories, and that none of my determinations would be changed even if the 
claims were considered, for example, under a conversion theory, I see no 
reason to permit such amendment, or to further address whether the 
amendments requested are too prejudicial to be permitted. In other 
words, the determinations that follow are the most that plaintiffs could 
receive, regardless of the theory asserted. 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
This case arises from plaintiffs' purchase of a house from 
defendants in Murray, Salt Lake County. The Real Estate Purchase 
Contract, submitted by buyers' agent to sellers' agent on May 6, 2005, 
along with three Addenda, govern the purchase. 
Plaintiffs, Thomas and Nancy 01 sen, relocated from California in the 
Spring of 2005. The Olsens worked through their agents, Kathleen and Ron 
Stone, and with Ms. Stone's assistance, Mr. Olsen narrowed the options 
to four possibilities. At that time, Mrs. Olsen, who was still in 
California {where the Olsens still resided) came to Utah and the Olsens 
inspected the homes together. 
The Olsens did not initially wish to buy as far west as the subject 
property, but when they walked through the home they liked the amenities 
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and the size of the house, and they appreciated the accessibility of the 
location in light of Mr. Olsen's need to travel to his clients. The 
Court finds that Mr. Lund was present during the walkthrough, and that 
he volunteered to Mr. Olsen that the home theater that appeared to be 
present did not come with the house, but that it "cost $6,000 if you want 
to buy it." 
Mr. Olsen observed the components of a theater system and noticed 
exposed wires. He noted that the system was not installed 
professionally. Mr. Olsen also noted coaxial cable coming into the 
house, apparently serving several rooms. The MLS listing stated that the 
house was "cable available," but did not state that the house was wired 
for cable. Nevertheless, Mr. Olsen assumed that the house was wired 
based on the coaxial cable he observed, along with a splitter box in the 
house that seemed to run coaxial cable to a number of rooms. I find that 
the MLS statement of cable available means only that cable is available 
in the area. It is not a statement that the house is wired for cable. 
There is a separate box on the MLS worksheet that can be checked if the 
house is cable wired, and this box was not checked. 
The house was listed for a price of $365,500. The Olsens' initial 
offer on May 6, 2005 was for $350,000, to include the microwave, range, 
refrigerator, water softener, theater system including screen, projector, 
speakers, satellite and dish. The offer also required that electrical 
wiring to the hot tub should remain in place. (See, Section 1.1, REPC.) 
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The Lunds did not accept this offer. Instead, they made a 
counteroffer that changed the terms, as follows: 
1 Sales price to be $365,500. 
2 Sale will not include theater system, screen, projector, 
speakers, satellite equipment or satellite dish. 
3 Sale will not include home warranty. 
Olsens counteroffered in response to Addendum 1 with Addendum 2, 
which provided: 
1 Sales price to be $360,000. Included in price will be all 
satellite dishes and receivers per paragraph 1.1 of Real Estate Purchase 
Contract. 
2 Not included in purchase is the home theater, hardware, 
mounts, cable and equipment. Damage from removal of home theater 
equipment will be repaired to original state, including paint to match. 
3 All other terms remain. 
The Lunds rejected that counteroffer, but made a further 
counteroffer as set forth in Addendum 3, as follows-. 
1 Sales price to be $365,500. 
2 Sale will include home theater system, hardware, mounts, 
cables and equipment (screen, speakers and projector). 
3 Sale will include satellite dish mounted on house. 
4 All other items to remain the same. 
That counteroffer was accepted. I note that Addendum 3 replaces all 
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language or conditions set forth in the REPC that are inconsistent with 
Addendum 3. Specifically, as I ruled early in the case, one effect of 
Addendum 3 is to remove the satellite receiver from the transaction. 
There was a satellite dish on the house, and it was included in the sale 
and received by the buyers at possession. I also note that despite 
statements by the Olsens that the payment of $365,500 establishes that 
they bought the theater system for $6,000, the evidence does not support 
this conclusion. The price was an increase of $5,500 over their second 
offer, which sum is close to Mr. Lund's stated price for a theater 
system, but this evidence is not persuasive evidence establishing the 
value of the theater system or the reasonable expectation of what the 
system would include. I make this finding because the Lunds never moved 
from their asking price (which was a reduced price before the Olsens made 
their offer). Negotiations from the Lunds' side did not include price 
movement at any time. In fact, I find that they were firm on the price, 
but that they included the home theater system and the satellite dish to 
close the deal and to avoid having to repair any damage that would result 
from removal of any of those items. 
Final walkthrough before closing and possession was June 12, 2005, 
a Sunday. Possession was given to the Olsens on June 14, 2005. Before 
the final walkthrough and closing, Olsens commissioned a home inspection. 
Following the inspection, the inspector wrote a letter dated May 11, 
2005, to Mr, Olsen, setting forth six items that needed to be corrected. 
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(See, plaintiffs' Exhibit 5.) On the same date, Mr. Olsen wrote a letter 
to Mr. and Mrs. Lund, noted attention: Candy Probert", the sellers' 
agent, which letter noted four primary concerns that needed correction. 
The first was fogged or leaking windows throughout the home." It is 
agreed that the windows were under warranty and repairs were completed. 
The second item was a concern about two outside GFI power plugs. The 
Lunds never replaced those plugs, and the Olsens corrected the perceived 
problem at their expense. The third item of concern was plumbing 
fixtures in two of the bathrooms which included a stripped or broken hot 
water handle in the upstairs bath, and the need for a faucet to be 
repaired or replaced, and a main floor sink faucet that was leaking, 
which also needed replacement. Those items were ultimately repaired at 
Olsens' expense in about late July. The final item was wood trim around 
the rear French door leading to the deck. Mr. Olsen stated that this 
item needed to be sealed and painted to prevent further deterioration to 
the trim and that caulking to seal the space or crack around the trim to 
prevent moisture from entering behind the stucco was necessary. 
With the exception of arranging for the windows to be repaired, the 
Court finds that the Lunds did not take any further steps regarding these 
items, but that the Olsens went ahead and closed without exercising their 
right to cancel the Contract. The parties agree that the items relating 
to plumbing (including sprinkler system issues to be addressed below), 
electrical (the GFI plugs), and appliances are included within Section 
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10.2(b), and therefore survive the closing and are not waived by Olsens' 
failure to insist upon completion of repairs before closing. 
Olsens did not raise any concerns following the walkthrough on June 
12, 2005, but after taking possession they claimed several problems, 
which gave rise to a demand letter dated July 17, 2 005, and in short 
order, this lawsuit. 
The demand letter referred to above was written by Mr. Olsen and 
addressed to Neil and Susan Lund* It referenced "missing items included 
in sale." Several items were specifically mentioned: First, missing 
hoses and attachments for the central vacuum system. Second, Mr. Olsen 
identified the DVD player, amplifier and subwoofer that he understood to 
be part of the home theater system. The parties agreed that the 
subwoofer was in fact present, and that issue was withdrawn. The final 
area of concern was repairs to the plumbing system (the faucet leaks, 
etc.), and the GFI outlets that were allegedly not working. Although 
Olsens claimed soon after that letter to have suffered a substantial loss 
of food through the failure of the refrigerator on or about June 18, 
2005, that item was not referenced. 
The July 17, 2005, letter gave the Lunds until July 27, 2005 to 
remedy the concerns, or a small claims action would be filed, Mr. Olsen 
claimed that the overall intent of the letter was to start a conversation 
to resolve matters amicably, but I do not find that the content or the 
tone of the letter conveys any such request. In fact, the letter gave 
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two deadlines: July 27 to fix the problems, and July 25 to respond to Mr. 
Lund. If the response deadline was missed, Mr. Lund stated that he would 
"be forced to obtain bids" to fix the listed items. In fact, the 
evidence establishes that the Olsens proceeded to obtain a bid for 
approximately $4,800 to address the items at least eleven days before the 
response deadline-and before the demand letter was sent. 
I will now proceed to the specific items. I note that the following 
pages include a number of items that were either resolved, withdrawn, or 
dismissed by the Court, but because of the substantial issue of 
attorney's fees and the need to determine the prevailing party, it is 
important to address all items that were claimed at any time during this 
action, and to determine the outcome with respect to each of those items. 
1 Satellite receivers. As indicated above, I ruled early in the 
trial that there was no basis under the Contract for the buyers to claim 
a right to the receivers. The final Addendum, setting forth the terms 
of the sale,, specifically referenced only the satellite dish, to remain 
"mounted on house." The Olsens' original claim for the receiver was 
$487.77. 
2 Microwave tray. The Olsens made a claim for $35 for a 
microwave tray, but they withdrew that claim during trial. . 
3 Garage remote. The Olsens claim that there should have been 
two garage remotes provided at the time of occupancy. In fact, only one 
was provided. Section 1.1, *Included Items," requires that the items 
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listed therein must be provided *if presently owned and attached to the 
property." Of course, the garage door opener itself is attached and even 
though the transmitter is not an attachment, it is an integral part of 
the opener. Nevertheless, Section 1.1 refers to "accompanying 
transmitter(s)," clearly including the possibility that there was only 
one transmitter owned at the time* In fact, the only direct evidence on 
the issue is that there was only one transmitter owned by the Lunds at 
the time of possession, and the circumstantial evidence offered by the 
Olsens does overcome that evidence and meet their burden. Also, although 
the initial claim was for $45, the only evidence supporting the damage 
claim for a replacement transmitter was a credit card charge for a $32.79 
Lowe's purchase. I find that plaintiffs' claim for the garage door 
remote fails because they have not proven the existence of more than one 
opener at the time of possession. 
4 Attachment set and hose sock for the central vacuum cleaner. 
Plaintiffs claimed $25.32 for an attachment set for the vacuum, and $40 
for a house sock. However, they admitted that they did not buy these 
items, and their claim fails. 
5 Mirror. There was an older mirror attached to a wall in a 
bedroom. The Olsens assumed that the mirror would remain as an 
attachment. The Lunds took the mirror, not considering it an attachment, 
but they also had no objection to leaving the mirror, had it been 
requested. The mirror was never listed in the demand letter of July 17, 
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2005, and was not added in the included items of Section l.l. I find 
that the Olsens have no legal right to the mirror. 
6 Dishwasher repair. I accept the Olsens' testimony that upon 
unpacking dishes and other items, they ran numerous dishwasher loads 
before putting those items away. The Olsens did not actually use china, 
glasses, or other washable kitchen items until they had been in the home 
about two weeks. Until that time, they used disposable plates, etc., to 
facilitate move-in and getting organized. When the Olsens ultimately 
attempted to wash dirty dishes, the result was that at the end of the 
cycle the food was baked onto the dishes, at which time the Olsens 
realized that dishwasher detergent was also baked into the bottom of the 
dishwasher, and the water was not connected. Obviously, the electricity 
was connected. 
The issue for the Court is whether the dishwasher was, in fact, 
connected at the time of move-in. The Lunds say that it was, and they 
have no reason to think the dishwasher would have been disconnected. The 
Olsens personally did nothing to disconnect the dishwasher, and I find 
their testimony credible, but I also find that the repairs the Olsens did 
to the kitchen faucet occurred within the first week or so of occupancy. 
I am persuaded that the most reasonable explanation for the disconnected 
dishwasher is that the person who did the faucet repair disconnected the 
dishwasher in the course of that work, and failed to reconnect the 
dishwasher, but that this happened after occupancy, and is not a 
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responsibility of the Lunds. 1 am not determining by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the disconnection occurred as suggested, but I do find 
that the Olsens have failed in their burden to present evidence that 
shows when the dishwasher was disconnected. Accordingly, the claim for 
repair cost of $45 fails, 
7 Refrigerator. The refrigerator presents another issue of what 
happened when. In fact, by reviewing the Olsens' Complaint, the 
reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom is that the Olsens initially 
complained that the refrigerator that was present during their inspection 
was "swapped out.'' The refrigerator is not mentioned in the July 17, 
2005, demand letter, but in time the Olsens claim that the refrigerator 
that was present failed on or about June 18, 2005, four days after move-
in. I do not dispute that the refrigerator failed in some way on June 
18, 2005, but I cannot from the evidence determine that the refrigerator 
was not working on the move-in date of June 14, 2005. I also find that 
the evidence establishes unequivocally (based on repair orders, purchase 
documents and matching serial numbers) that the refrigerator left at the 
house was the same one that was purchased roughly five years before, and 
that was seen in the kitchen by the Olsens at each visit before 
possession. 
Unfortunately, because the June 18 problems were not included in the 
demand letter or otherwise reported to the Lunds, the Olsens were unable 
to take advantage of the five year warranty that was still in force until 
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August, 2005. In addition, there is substantial evidence that even 
though there was some kind of failure on June 18, 2005, the refrigerator 
was not in fact inoperable thereafter. Nevertheless, the Olsens moved 
the refrigerator out of the house and installed another refrigerator they 
possessed. Twenty months later, a repair service called by the Olsens 
was able to fix the refrigerator for $145, and the nature of the problem 
and the fact that the refrigerator worked on that day leads to a finding 
that the refrigerator compressor certainly was not broken in 2005 and 
there was still freon {or refrigerant) in the refrigerator 20 months 
after possession. Unfortunately, the refrigerator then failed again just 
days later. I am sympathetic to the Olsens for the problems they 
encountered with the refrigerator, but none of these problems can be laid 
at the feet of the sellers under either the Contract language or the 
facts that have been established regarding what occurred with respect to 
the refrigerator. 
8 Repairs to the house. The repairs to the house include repair 
of faucets, main floor bathroom sink, caulking back doors, cleaning up 
paint splotches on exterior door and patio, repair cable television 
connection to the appropriate bedrooms and to the outside connection, 
sheetrock tape and texture damaged walls as needed, and related work and 
materials. The total invoice (plaintiffs' Exhibit 20) was for $4,825. 
I have already ruled that the inclusive invoice, lacking itemization or 
independent corroborative and explanatory evidence, does not permit the 
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Court to determine damages for any particular item without resorting to 
speculation; accordingly, those damages cannot be awarded. 
In addition, however, plaintiffs have not made out a claim for cable 
wiring in any event. The gravamen of their claim is that coaxial cables 
were present in the house, that the cable functioning was impaired by a 
screw that had been driven through the cable in the garage, and that 
because the cables were present it was reasonable for plaintiffs to 
assume that there was wiring in place, and that the wiring was part of 
the electrical System that must be in working order pursuant to the REPC. 
Again, I am somewhat sympathetic to this portion of the claim, in 
light of the fact that some cable was present, but that is not enough to 
support the claim. In fact, the MLS clearly stated that the house was 
cable available, not cable wired. It is also clear that there was a 
question regarding how many rooms were serviced by coaxial cable in any 
event. In addition, defendants testified that they never had cable or 
satellite television and that their entire television viewing was limited 
to that which was available through a roof antenna. The antenna is very 
visible on the roof of the house, and the coaxial cable runs to that 
antenna. Plaintiffs are as much on notice of the existence of the 
antenna as they would be of the cables. With both those factors present, 
it is inexplicable that plaintiff did not ask questions to resolve any 
conflict between the MLS, the antenna, and the existence of coaxial 
cable. Accordingly, I cannot find liability for the cable claim, but 
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even if I could, the damage evidence utterly fails. 
The leaks to the faucets, the defective handle, the allegedly faulty 
GFI power plugs, and other related matters, may well have been items 
chargeable to sellers under Section 10.2(b), but the Court is without 
evidence to determine the damage incurred, and those claims must fail. 
With respect to the foregoing items and merely for the sake of 
completeness, I address defendants' claim that Mr. Lund could have 
repaired many of these items at very little cost, had he been permitted 
to do so. I do not need to reach that issue in light of other rulings, 
but I feel constrained to note that Mr- Lund did not have a specific 
right to insist upon doing the repairs, although he may have had a right 
to have some say in how the repairs were done and at what cost. 
Nevertheless, because of the other factors noted, I cannot reach those 
defenses. 
9 Central vacuum hose. It is undisputed that the Lunds took the 
vacuum hoses when they moved out, and the lack of those hoses rendered 
the vacuum system unuseable. I find that removal of the hoses was 
inadvertent, but it was still the responsibility of the Lunds to find and 
return the hoses very soon after they were notified, at the latest on 
July 17, 2005. In fact, the hoses were returned on August 3 0, 2005, but 
not before the Olsens had purchased replacement hoses. 
I understand defendants' position that Olsens admitted they would 
have used two sets of hoses in any event, but failure to return the hoses 
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more promptly left the Olsens without use of the vacuum system they 
purchased, and that inconvenience lasted for about two and one-half 
months. The Olsens are entitled to be compensated for the purchase of 
a hose set, even though the original hoses were ultimately returned. 
Olsens shall be awarded Judgment for hoses in the amount of $337.50, plus 
tax at 6.6%, for a total of $359.77, plus pre-judgment interest at 10% 
from the date of purchase, July 20, 2005.. I take that sum, and the 
purchase date, from Clean Smart Janitorial Supply invoice number 12053. 
I note that there is a substantial question about some of the invoices 
provided with respect to the hose, and that the original claim by 
plaintiff is for two sets of hoses at $537 each, which amount was 
restated in deposition, but I am persuaded that the legitimate loss is 
the amount set forth herein. 
Finally, with respect to this item, I note plaintiffs' concern that 
one or both of the Lunds entered their garage on August 30, 2005, without 
permission. That did occur, but trespass was not alleged in the 
Complaint and even if I were to conform the pleadings to reflect the 
evidence on this question, I am at a loss to determine what damages, 
other than a possible $1 nominal damages, could apply. I decline to make 
such an award under the circumstances of the return of the hoses, partly 
because I am persuaded that the Lunds entered the garage for the sole 
purpose of safeguarding the property they were returning. Utah does 
recognize an action for intrusion upon seclusion or privacy, but that 
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claim was not advanced, and no damage has been established. 
10 Sprinklers. Plaintiff claims $3 95 for sprinkler repair. This 
is a fairly difficult item. Photographic evidence suggests that the lawn 
was in fair to good shape two days before possession. Nevertheless, I 
can see the browning area in the photograph indicated by plaintiffs, and 
there is no evidence rebutting plaintiffs' claim that work was done at 
a cost of $395, and that certain sprinkler items were replaced, on or 
about June 23, 2005, just nine days after the Olsens took possession. 
Defendants have raised a question about the bona fides of Greener Lawns, 
the purported business name of the repair service, but that evidence does 
not persuade me that the Olsens had anything to do with a possible misuse 
of a trade name by the repairman. The only direct evidence is that work 
was done over a couple of days and that the sprinklers had been 
malfunctioning. Those sprinklers could not be inspected in May, 2005, 
because of the weather, and the warranty of 10.2(b) regarding sprinklers 
survived closing. Accordingly, plaintiffs should be granted judgment for 
sprinklers in the amount of $395, plus pre-judgment interest at 10% from 
the date of service, June 23, 2005. 
11 Home theater/surround sound. Much of the trial was consumed 
with the issue of the home theater and surround sound. I will first 
address surround sound. Plaintiffs expressed great concern that surround 
sound was listed in the MLS and in an advertising flyer, and they 
considered it part of the deal from the outset. 1 agree with plaintiffs 
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that surround sound was advertised, and that they had a right to insist 
that whatever that meant, it was present at closing. In fact, no 
elements of surround sound are set forth in any detail in the REPC; 
plaintiffs did not raise any concerns about what was present as so-called 
"surround sound," before closing; surround sound is not a 10.2 warranted 
item; and the abrogation clause, Section 19, makes it clear that any such 
provision of the contract shall not apply after closing. The simple 
answer is that plaintiffs did not raise any concern regarding what was 
present before closing; they did not exercise any right to cancel, if 
there was such a right connected to surround sound; and they cannot now 
complain of the nature of the speaker system in the house, even if bears 
no resemblance to the surround sound systems described by various 
witnesses. Plaintiffs shall recover nothing for any deficiency in 
surround sound in the subject property. 
The home theater system is obviously an issue that has created a lot 
of heat in this lawsuit. It appears to me that in this case two parties 
had completely different views of what the home theater system meant, but 
in the absence of ambiguity, the Contract governs. Section 1.1 refers 
to the "theater system including screen, projector, speakers." It is my 
determination that the actual definition of the theater system to be 
delivered at possession is the somewhat more complete description in 
Addendum 3: "Sale will include home theater system, hardware, mounts, 
cables and equipment (screen, speakers and projector)." The evidence 
OLSEN V. LUND PAGE 18 RULING AND ORDER 
establishes that in fact everything listed in the foregoing sentence was 
left at the house- Photographs and testimony make it clear that this was 
not a state-of-the-art or sophisticated theater system. In fact, Mr. 
Olsen testified that it was clear to him on first inspection that the 
system was not professionally installed* 
The present controversy appears to have arisen in some part from the 
early statement by Mr. Lund, which I find was uttered, that the system 
was worth $6,000 and could be purchased. Despite that statement, nothing 
that subsequently occurred persuades me that Olsens paid $6,000 for the 
home theater system present in the house as a discrete item, let alone 
for an optimal system. I find that what the Addendum promised was 
delivered. There has been a concession, in a sense, by the Lunds 
ultimately returning the DVD and amplifier, which are both of relatively 
low value, but I find they were not obligated to return those items, 
because they are not part of the home theater system as defined in the 
Contract, or as usually delivered in connection with a real estate sale. 
The amplifier and the DVD have been referred to in this lawsuit as input 
devices; that is, an appliance that plays the media that is intended to 
be enjoyed through the system. Again, I can understand the Olsens' 
disappointment if they envisioned a sophisticated home theater system 
with all items in place that would allow them to sit in their family room 
and enjoy movies, etc., but nothing in the law and the facts of this case 
entitle them to have such an expectation, let alone an expectation that 
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if the home theater system was not what they contemplated, that they 
should receive a system valued from $8,000 to $12,000. This claim must 
be denied. 
Based on the foregoing, I conclude that the vast majority of 
plaintiffs' claims must be denied, but that they should be awarded 
Judgment for the hoses and sprinklers as set forth above. 
The Real Estate Purchase Contract has an attorney's fee provision. 
It awards fees to the prevailing party. In this case, plaintiffs have 
prevailed on two very small items out of a total claim that has changed 
greatly over the course of the action, but that was between approximately 
$10,000 and $20,000 over the course of the case and the trial. In other 
words, plaintiffs prevailed minimally, or perhaps they lost 
substantially. I have considered not awarding fees to either side, but 
I will give plaintiffs a chance to present an Attorney's Fee Affidavit 
strictly allocating the fees necessary to prove the two claims on which 
they have prevailed. I will consider that claim, along with any 
opposition from defendants, before I make a final decision on attorney's 
fees. Briefing on the general topic of entitlement to fees under the 
facts of this case will also be welcome. 
This ruling is the Order of the Court, but final Judgment and the 
commencement of time for appeal, will await determination of the 
attorney's fees issue. When that occurs, I will instruct one of the 
lawyers to prepare an Order and Judgment consistent with this Ruling and 
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my ultimate determinations regarding fees and costs. 
Dated this 30th day of March, 2009. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Ruling and Order, to the following, this pCF day of March, 
2009: 
Kenneth R. Ivory 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
9067 South 1300 West, Suite 304 
West Jordan, Utah 84 088 
J. Steven Newton 
Attorney for Defendants 
8170 S. Highland Drive, Suite E-5 
Sandy, Utah 84093 
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This matter came before the court on defendant's "Motion for 
Determination that Defendants are the Prevailing Parties and in 
the Alternative for Limited Discovery and an Evidentiary Hearing 
on Reasonable Attorney Fees of Plaintiff Through February 3, 
2006" filed in response to the Court's request for further 
briefing in its March 30, 2009 ruling. The Court having reviewed 
the pleadings and record, hereby rules as follows. 
BACKGROUND & ARGUMENTS 
This matter came before the Court for four days of trial in 
which the Court awarded plaintiffs a total judgment of $754.77 on 
two claims. The Real Estate Purchase Contract (REPC) upon which 
plaintiffs sued contains a provision awarding the prevailing 
party attorney fees. In its Ruling, the Court left open the 
question of which, if any party might be entitled to attorney 
fees, stating: 
In this case, plaintiffs have prevailed on two very 
small items on a total claim that has changed greatly 
over the course of the action, but that was between 
approximately $10,000 and $20,000 over the course of 
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the case and trial. In other words, plaintiffs 
prevailed minimally, or perhaps they lost substantially 
under the provision of the REPC where the prevailing 
party is entitled to its attorney fees* I have 
considered not awarding fees to either side but I will 
give plaintiffs a chance to present an Attorney's Fee 
Affidavit strictly allocating the fees necessary to 
prove the two claims on which they have prevailed. 
March 30, 2009 Ruling, at 19. 
Defendants ask the Court to declare them the prevailing 
party, or to allow them to conduct discovery on attorney fees 
plaintiffs are entitled to if the court finds they prevailed. 
Defendants claim to be the prevailing party because they asserted 
no counterclaims and plaintiffs obtained relief on only two of 
eleven claims• Plaintiffs were awarded $754.77, which represents 
a net recovery of only 3.2% of the amount plaintiffs asked the 
Court to award. Further, defendants tried to move the case to 
small claims court and they made a Rule 68 Offer of Judgement for 
$5,000 in February 2006, which plaintiffs rejected and which is 
additional grounds to award them fees. 
Plaintiffs counter that there can only be one prevailing 
party, and under the net recovery rule they are the prevailing 
party and that the flexible and reasoned approach does not apply 
to this case. The court finds plaintiff's statement of the law to 
be unsupported. Nonetheless, as the prevailing party plaintiffs 
claim they should recover 81.5 hours of work, for the time it 
took to prevail on vxtwo elevenths" of their claims. 
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DISCISSION 
.A* A Contract or Statute Musi Authorize Any Awaid of 
Attorney Fees. 
In Utah, a party is entitled to attorney fees only if a 
statute or a contract authorizes such fees. Fericks v. Lucv Ann 
Soffe Trust, 2004 UT 85, f 23, 100 P.3d 1200. In the present case 
the REPC authorizes such an award of fees, stating "[i]n the 
event of litigation or binding arbitration to enforce this 
Contract, the prevailing party shall be entitled to costs and 
reasonable attorney fees.'' REPC, at 11 17. Accordingly the Court 
must determine the prevailing party. 
B, The Court Uses the Flexible and Reasoned Approach 
to Consider if There is a Prevailing Party. 
"*The question of which party is the prevailing party 
*depends, to a large measure, on the context of each case, and, 
therefore, it is appropriate to leave this determination to the 
sound discretion of the trial court.'"' Larry J. Coet Chevrolet, 
Pontiac, Buick, Inc. v. Labrum, 2008 UT App 69, f 23, 180 P.3d 
765 (citing Radman v. Flanders Corp., 2007 UT App 351, f 26, 172 
P.3d 668 (quoting R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, 5 25, 40 
P.3d 1119) . The Court uses "the flexible and reasoned approach . 
. . [to] identify a clearly successful party that is genuinely 
entitled to receive attorney fees. . . . [it is in] the trial 
courts' discretion to decide which additional common sense 
perspectives are most appropriate to consider in future cases." 
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A.K.&R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Guv, 2004 UT 47, fl 26, 94 
P.3d 270. For example, the Court "may appropriately consider, 
among other things (1) contractual language, (2) the number of 
claims, counterclaims, cross-claims, etc., brought by the 
parties, (3) the importance of the claims relative to each other 
and their significance in the context of the lawsuit considered 
as a whole, and (4) the dollar amounts attached to and awarded in 
connection with the various claims." Larry J. Coet Chevrolet, 
Pontiac, Buick, Inc., 2008 Ut App I 20 (citing A.K. & R.Whipple 
Plumbing 6 Heating, 2004 UT 1 25 and Radman, 2007 UT App % 
2 6)(emphasis added). 
The Court begins by considering the parties' net recovery. 
Plaintiffs claim that is the only factor the Court needs to 
consider, but that argument is unsupported. See J. Pochvnok Co. 
v. Srnedsrud, 2003 UT App 375, I 12, 80 P. 3d 563 (rev'd on other 
grounds by 2005 UT 39)(stating M[t]he net recovery rule *xneed 
not be applied strictly' to every prevailing party 
determination."(citations omitted)). Utah courts have found that 
"rigid application of the net judgment rule can result in 
unreasonable awards of attorney fees." A.K.&R. Whipple Plumbing & 
"Heating, 2004 UT I 26; and see Mt» States Broad. Co. v. Neale, 
783 P.2d 551, 558 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)(memorandum 
decision)("nothing . * . should be taken to suggest that the net 
judgment rule can be mechanically applied in all cases, although 
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it will usually be at least a good starting point."). 
C. There is no Prevailing Party 
"The facts and circumstances surrounding a determination of 
prevailing party status vary widely. Because of those variances, 
we believe it entirely appropriate, when adequately supported by 
the facts, to conclude . . . that there is no prevailing party." 
A.K, & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating, 2002 UT App at 1 18. The 
flexible and reasoned approach "ensures that only parties that 
are genuinely ^successful' according to the trial court's common 
sense logic will be able to extract their attorney fees from 
their opponents.'" J. Pochvnok Co,, Inc. v> Smedsrud, 2005 UT 39, 
I 20, 116 P.3d 353. 
In this case, neither party was "genuinely successful" when 
the Court considers the case in context and parties' recovery. 
This case was filed in August 2005, and plaintiffs asserted at 
least the eleven claims that were eventually brought to trial and 
asked for thousands in damages and fees. In February 2006, 
defendants made an Offer of Judgment for $5,000. In the 
intervening years the parties conducted discovery, fought about 
discovery, fought more about discovery, and argued to the point 
where the Court granted plaintiffs' motion for a protective order 
and ordered the parties to conduct depositions supervised by the 
Court. In February and March 2009, this case came on for four 
days of trial. Ultimately the court awarded plaintiffs a judgment 
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of $754.77 on two of their claims* 
When the Court weighs and considers the relative "victories'' 
in this case, that plaintiffs prevailed on two claims and 
defendants successfully defended the majority of the claims. 
Ultimately the results of this case are a pyrrhic victory for 
both sides. Such a victory does not equate to genuine success or 
prevailing. This was a relatively simple case that could and 
should have been resolved in far fewer than four years and with 
far fewer fruitless activities. Plaintiffs only prevailed on 
vacuum hoses and sprinkler repairs for minimal amounts. 
Even if the Court were persuaded that plaintiffs spent 81.5 
hours to prevail on these two claims or that defendants were 
somehow justified in their questionable actions that prolonged 
discovery, the court would have difficulty applying common sense 
to find either party had actually prevailed in the sense of being 
genuinely successful. It is simply common sense to find that 
neither party has prevailed and neither is entitled to extract 
attorney fees from the other. 
D. Plaintiffs are not Independently Entitled to an Award 
of Attorney Fees Under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 68. 
Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure does not 
independently authorize an award of attorney fees. UT R. Civ. Pro 
68. Having determined that there is no prevailing party entitled 
to attorney fees under the REPC, plaintiffs are not entitled to 
attorney fees under the Rule alone. 
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Based on the foregoing, defendants' motion is hereby DENIED 
and neither party is awarded attorney fees from the other. 
This is the final Order of the Court, no further Order is 
required. 
DATED this J2&? day of July 2009. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS W. OLSEN and NANCY OLSEN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
NEIL LUND and SUSAN LUND, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 050914481 
Judge Robert K. Hilder 
The Court's finding of fact and conclusions of law having been entered in the Court's Ruling 
and Order dated March 30, 2009 and in its Memorandum Decision dated . iated July 23, 2009,ihe Court J^ty**--
•enters judgment in favor of Plaintiffs in the amount of $796.33 as follows: 
a. Principal due on vacuum hoses $359.77 
Interest thereon (10% from 7/20/05 to 2/06/06) $ 19.81 
tz$»-
' & 
b. Principal due on sprinklers $395.00 
Interest thereon (10% from 7/20/05 to 2/06/06) $21.75 
TOTAL $796.33 
Dated J/& 
JD29761852 
05O914481 LUND.NEIL 
_, 2009. 
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A true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT was hand-delivered to: 
Ivory Law, P.C. 
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Bryan L. Quick 
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West Jordan, UT 84088 
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